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ABSTRACT
In 1935/36 Kurt Gödel wrote three notebooks on the foundations of quantum me-
chanics, which have now been entirely transcribed for the first time. Whereas a lot
of the material is rather technical in character, many of Gödel’s remarks have a
philosophical background and concentrate on Leibnizian monadology as well as on
vitalism. Obviously influenced by the vitalistic writings of Hans Driesch and his
‘proofs’ for the existence of an entelechy in every living organism, Gödel briefly
develops the idea of a computing machine which closely resembles Turing’s ground-
breaking conception. After introducing the notebooks on quantum mechanics, this
article describes Gödel’s vitalistic Weltbild and the ideas leading to the development
of his computing machine. It investigates a notion of lawlike sequence which closely
resembles Turing’s concept of a computable number and which Gödel himself calls
‘problematic’, and compares it to the opposed concept of randomness, drawing upon
the notion of program size complexity. Finally, Gödel’s machine is implemented in
a dialect of the Lisp programming language.
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It is a well known fact that Kurt Gödel, during his whole adult life, devoted a great
part of his time and energy to philosophy. According to Hao Wang (Wang 1987,
p. 27), all of Gödel’s important work ‘is closely related to philosophy: in philosophy or
philosophically motivated or having philosophical consequences or using philosophy as
heuristic principles. It may even be supposed that, for him, all fundamental theoretical
work is related to philosophy in one or more of the four nonexclusive ways.’ This
article will concentrate on the second way, philosophically motivated work, exemplarily
pointing out an early anticipation of what is nowadays called the Turing machine,
explaining how Gödel’s thoughts about this topic may have been influenced by his
early vitalistic views.
∗Email: tim.lethen@helsinki.fi
Gödel’s vitalistic tendencies are clearly expressed in a set of notebooks on quan-
tum mechanics written in Vienna in 1935/36. In these books, which have now been
entirely transcribed from the Gabelsberger shorthand system by the present author,
Gödel, opposing materialism, not only carefully describes his vitalistic Weltbild but
also briefly develops the idea of a computing machine, obviously drawing upon ideas
taken from the writings of Hans Driesch, who may be described as the driving force
of neovitalism in the early 20th century.
As a starting point, the article is briefly going to describe the notebooks on quan-
tum mechanics and their contents. It will then introduce vitalism as part of Gödel’s
Weltanschauungen and describe one of Driesch’s main ideas for a proof of the existence
of an entelechy in every living organism.
Gödel’s idea of a computing machine along with its basic properties will then be
presented, emphasising the influence of an underlying philosophy. At the same time,
connections are drawn to the Turing machine, its capabilities, and its information-
theoretic restrictions.
Finally, an implementation of the machine as described in his notebooks on quantum
mechanics is presented. It is written in a dialect of the programming language Lisp
which supports an easy implementation of a universal machine which tries to run
binary programs up to a given time limit.
While usually most of the material concerning Gödel’s Weltanschauung is taken ei-
ther from works published during his lifetime, or from sources published posthumously,
this article will take the opportunity and present a collection of unpublished material
in connection with Gödel’s philosphical views. These excerpts are mainly taken from
notebooks in his Nachlass such as the MaxPhil series, and his notebooks on quan-
tum mechanics, written in the mid 1930s and preserved in his Nachlass in Princeton.
Transcriptions from the Gabelsberger shorthand system were produced by the author
as part of the Gödeliana project based in Helsinki, Finland. The original German
source material (linked by a mark 〈n〉 in the running text) is given in an appendix.
2. Gödel’s notebooks on quantum mechanics
In 1935, Gödel wrote two complete notebooks1, altogether nearly 200 pages, expressing
his ideas, thoughts, and questions about the foundations of quantum mechanics, care-
fully devised into a systematic list of about 340 items. Whereas the earlier remarks
cover mainly technical material, they become more and more philosophical, finally
leading to what might be described as Gödel’s first steps in philosophy, an attempt
to apply Leibnizian monadology to quantum mechanics and physics in general, cov-
ering topics like free will, the direction of time, and the borderline between observer
and experiment. The books also contain the compilation of what Gödel later calls his
physical ‘Arbeitsprogramm [working program]’, a list of topics like ‘Spin’ and ’Proj.
Rel. Theorie’ he obviously planned to work on.
Only one year later, in a period of great personal instability, Gödel revised his
own notes in a third book titled ‘Aflenz 1936 (Analysis, Physik).’2 While leaving out
or simply just copying some of the earlier items, others are carefully reformulated
1The books are simply titled ‘Quantenmech. I ’ and ‘Quantenmech. II ’. Kurt Gödel Papers, Box 6b, Folder
78, item accessions 030106 and 030107, on deposit with the Manuscripts Division, Department of Rare Books
and Special Collections, Princeton University Library. Used with permission of Institute for Advanced Study.
Unpublished Copyright Institute for Advanced Study. All rights reserved.
2Kurt Gödel Papers, Box 6a, Folder 59, item accession 030082.
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and extended, thus leading to an updated list of 143 items3. This revision offers the
opportunity to follow the development of his ideas and thoughts and to judge upon
the role they play in Gödel’s considerations.
3. Neovitalism
In a draft of a lecture called ‘The modern development of the foundations of mathe-
matics in the light of philosophy’ (Gödel 1961 ) written in 1961 or shortly thereafter,
Gödel presents a general scheme of Weltanschauungen, ordered by their affinity to
metaphysics or religion. Whereas scepticism, materialism and positivism stand on one
side, spiritualism, idealism, and theology stand on the other. He observes a clear shift
from ‘right to left’, i.e. a turning away from theology towards materialism, having
reached its peak especially in the field of physics and leading to what he considers ‘the
end of all theoretical science.’
In the same draft, materialism is described as ‘regard[ing] the world as an unordered
and therefore meaningless heap of atoms.’ It is well known that Gödel clearly opposed
this view, and item 252 of Quantenmechanik II —strongly drawing upon Leibnizian
monadistic views—clearly underlines this opposition:
The monad of an animal body is an existence, on the other hand somehow identical with
organization [order of the parts]. This becomes understandable by photochemistry. As a
result, an apparent substance (light quantum) transforms into an organization (complex
structure). From the principle of conservation of individuals it follows that this complex
structure is a certain simple substance. 〈1〉
And a remark in his philosophical notebook MaxPhil V 4 hints at the elements that
materialism and positivism are lacking in order to suit Gödel’s personal views. On
page 344 he writes:
Remark (Philosophy): The materialistic (positivistic) worldview means to reality that
there are only laws of pressure and shock [and otherwise only chaos] and only material
things. Another form, that there are only sensations and laws of their succession. An
extension is possible in two ways:
1.) As for the existing things: soul, concepts, angels.
2.) As for the existing laws (i.e., general facts): justice, superstition, etc.
Positivism is better in that at least no restriction of the laws, but in truth there are no
laws formable at all. [...] Positivism is the only form of materialism that can still exist in
the present. 〈2〉
His vitalistic viewpoint is clearly exposed and carefully described in item 2835 of
the notebook Quantenmechanik II :
Apparently, there are superior organizational forms.
1. unorganized ether maybe = light





3The items in this book are first numbered consecutively from 1 to 72. From then on, the numbers used are
the same as the corresponding ones in the earlier two books, jumping over left out items.
4Kurt Gödel Papers, Box 6b, Folder 67, item accession 030091. This notebook was written between May and
July 1942.
5The number 283 itself is actually missing but can be reconstructed from the numbering in the Aflenz book.
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Although every thing of level n contains things of level n − 1 as part, it is not to be
understood as an aggregate of these. That is, its behavior can not be explained by
spatiotemporal laws regarding things of the (n− 1)-th type. That is, the state (relation
to each other) [necessary for the prediction of the behavior] of the elementary parts is
not a spatial relationship. For example, two hydrogen atoms can stand in the relation of
‘forming a hydrogen molecule’ or in the relation of ‘forming two separate hydrogen atoms’
and then behave differently, though the probabilities of the spatiotemporal positions may
be similar. Likewise, an atomic system may perhaps stand in the relationship of ‘forming
an organism’ or ‘forming a cluster of atoms’, and behave differently accordingly. That is,
an organism is not described by stating the space-time position of the atoms forming it,
but it is also necessary to add something of the kind ‘and they form an organism’. Or
there is also an entelechy. [This would be the difference between organism and machine,
but would not exclude the possibility of an artificial production of life.] From this would
follow, for example: Organization can not be explained by field-like effects propagated in
the living substance [because these would have to be the same in the case of matter in
an unorganized state]. 〈3〉
This passage strongly resembles statements formulated by Hans Driesch, who can be
regarded as the driving force of Neovitalism at the time (see Driesch 1905, 1928 ),
and whose name is explicitly given in item 263 of Quantenmechanik II.6 In his Gifford
lectures, published in 1908, Driesch writes (Driesch 1928, p. 15):
The organism is a specific individual body composed of a typical combination of different
specific parts, each performing a particular physiological function. [...] but the organism
is not an aggregate, not even for the most superficial consideration. 〈4〉
And he continues (p. 36):
The adult organism is evidently a multi-level structure: it consists of organs as a partial
whole, these of tissues, these of cells, these of intracellular substances, these of molecules,
these of electrons. But we can now say of the development of the organism that, on
its way from the egg to the adult, it transfers the living being from a low-grade to a
high-grade manifold, at least as far as the visible is concerned. 〈5〉
The connection between vitalism and quantum mechanics was certainly no stranger
at the time. In his Aflenz book, Gödel writes:
Quantum mechanics favours the mystical solutions of the questions vitalism, second sight,
Gestalt theory, relation between brain and consciousness, because the other solutions
follow only from the assumption of spacetime physics as framework. The question ‘How
does the process proceed spatiotemporally,’ which is the most fruitful means of analyzing
a phenomenon, has for the first time proved infertile and meaningless in the process of
radiation. Perhaps it is the same with the unexplained appearances in quotation marks
above. (They are only inexplicable by asking this question, that is, by the use of space-
time physics.) 〈6〉
The phenomena in quotation marks Gödel is refering to include (amongst others)
stigmatization7, the inheritance of acquired traits8, and the increasing of the number
of twin births after the war9. It is worth noting how Driesch himself, of course without
alluding to quantum mechanics, formulates the essence of the doctrine of the autonomy
of life. In Driesch 1928, p. 126, he writes:
6Here Gödel writes: ‘Driesch, Entwicklung eines ganzen Organs aus einer halben Knospe.’ Other names
mentioned in this remark are those of the biologists Bleuler, Spemann, and Hartmann.
7Gödel obviously was very interested in the stigmatization of Therese von Konnersreuth. Her name often
appears in his theological notes.
8In a footnote to item 263 of Quantenmechanik II, Gödel refers to an article by Eugen Bleuler on this topic.
9In this connection, Gödel refers to ‘Arch. f. soz. u. Demogr. I, 1926, H.4’ in item 305 of Quantenmechanik
II.
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Certain events on living bodies are of such a nature that they can not be deduced from a
knowledge of the coordinates (positions), forces, and velocities of the individual physical
elements. 〈7〉
In order to complete the picture, we finish this section with two remarks about
vitalism and entelechies which Gödel states in his philosphical notebooks MaxPhil
XI 10 (pp. 43) and MaxPhil XIV 11 (pp. 76), respectively. Both passages leave no doubt
that Gödel, nearly ten years after writing his comments on the foundations of quantum
mechanics, still abided by his vitalistic views. The first one was written in 1944 and
reads:
Is the difference between the living and the lifeless maybe that its causal laws can not
be captured in ‘mechanical’ rules, that is, not ‘formalized’? So that means a higher level
of complication. The view contrary to vitalism simply asserts: all living things are dead.
〈8〉
The second remark was probably written by the end of the 1940s and emphasises an
interesting role of the entelechy.
Separation is disharmony, union is harmony. So what we want in the end is to return to
unity. [But maybe the evil creatures just want the separation?] So that means ‘balancing’
[equalization after Goldstein]. The same principle is also expressed in the laws of physics,
and therefore the equation V̈ = k∆V is so common. But this physical equalization
principle is probably not the only one, and so there are entelechies, which are nothing
but higher ‘harmonizers’. Perhaps even the particle problem and quantum mechanics
require such ‘higher’ harmonizers [that is, in addition to the equalization expressed in
the field equations]. 〈9〉
4. The Gödel machine
Alan M. Turing introduced his computing device, which has ever since been known as
the Turing machine, in his groundbreaking paper ‘On Computable Numbers, with an
Application to the Entscheidungsproblem’ (Turing 1936–7 ).12 It is truly remarkable
that Turing not only introduced the concept of a programmable machine, he also
defined the notion of a universal machine, taking both its program and the required
data on the same input device, a bidirectional infinite tape. At the same time he was
immediately able to foresee the machines’ theoretical limitations, instantiated by the
now famous halting problem. It is worth noting that during the same period13 Emil L.
Post independently introduced a very similar concept in his paper ‘Finite combinatory
Processes, Formulation I ’ (Post 1936 ), one of the main differences being that he did
not speak of a machine but rather of a ‘problem solver or worker’ working in a symbol
space, again consisting of a ‘two way infinite sequence of spaces or boxes.’
Following Hao Wang (Wang 1987, p. 111), Gödel considered ‘Turing’s justification
of the adequacy of his precise concept to the intuitive notion of computability as a piece
of philosophical work.’ And in connection with this intuitive notion, Wang continues
(p. 170): ‘It is, however, according to G., only Turing’s work of 1936 on computable
numbers that for the first time presented a convincing analysis to show us the correct
perspective by which to see the intuitive concept clearly’ and (p. 109) ‘He was probably
10Kurt Gödel Papers, Box 6b, Folder 70, item accession 030097. I am indebted to Maria Hämeen-Anttila for
bringing this passage to my attention.
11Kurt Gödel Papers, Box 6b, Folder 72, item accession 030099.
12The paper was received in May 1936 and published in January 1937.
13The paper was received in October 1936 and published in September 1936.
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a, 0 → L, a









b, 0 → stop
a, b, c, d sind die ‘Stellungen’,
L = links, R = rechts,
∗, ∗̄, 1, 1′′, 1′′′ sind die ‘Zei-
chen.’
Figure 1.: Gödel’s Turing machine, replacing every 1 by a 1′. As usual, L and R denote
a shift of the I/O-head, a and b are the machine’s possible states (or ‘Stellungen,’ as
Gödel calls them).
surprised by Turing’s solution, which was more elegant and conclusive than he had
expected.’14
Very soon, Gödel himself began programming Turing machines. On a single page
found in his notebook Arbeitsheft 6 15 and titled ‘Turing’sche Berechenbarkeit ≡ Her-
brand’scher, Einschub’, he implements two small (slightly erronous) programs, headed
respectively:
(1) Es gibt eine Maschine für die Veränderung aller 1 in 1′.
[There is a machine for changing every 1 into a 1′.]
(2) Es gibt eine Maschine, welche ebenso viele 1′ aufschreibt, als 1 dastehen, nach einem ∗
Zeichen.
[There is a machine which writes as many 1′ as there are 1, behind a ∗ sign.]
If only for historical reasons, the first of these two programs is reproduced in Figure
1. The page ends with the comment ‘Ende Einschub’, and so far no connecting pages
could be traced.16
Returning to the topic of vitalism, it is now of central importance that all of Driesch’s
‘proofs’ for the existence of an entelechy are based on the idea that certain phenomena
within a living organisms simply cannot be reduced to a purely mechanistic behaviour
of a machine or a collective of machines. Of course, in this connection the term machine
has to be understood in the widest sense, and in Driesch 1928 (p. 117), Driesch himself
describes it as follows:
We will understand the word ‘machine’ in its most general sense. For us, a machine is
therefore a typical arrangement of physical and chemical constituents, through the impact
of which a typical effect is achieved. 〈10〉
The proof which might have influenced Gödel most is described by Driesch in
Driesch 1905 as his ‘second proof, based on the genesis of complex equipotential
systems.’ His experiments with the egg of the sea urchin, in which he agitated the
14In his Gibbs Lecture Gödel 1951, Gödel expresses his opinion as follows: ‘The most satisfactory way, in my
opinion, is that of reducing the concept of finite procedure to that of a machine with a finite number of parts,
as has been done by the British mathematician Turing.’
15Kurt Gödel Papers, Box 5c, Folder 18, item accession 030024.
16I am indebted to Jan von Plato for pointing out that Gödel briefly refers to this page in a notebook called
Excerptenheft 7 (Kurt Gödel Papers, Box 6a, Folder 56, item accession 030080). Here, in a list of eight items
probably written in 1945 and simply headed ‘Lesen’, the last item reads ‘Idee Turing A.H.6 p.-4.’
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embryo at the two-cell and four-cell stage until it disassociated into separate cells
each of which then developed normally, led him to the conclusion that there should be
some complexity inherent in the very first cell which is completely preserved when this
cell splits into two. Driesch then argues that indeed no machine can keep its complex
structure when it is devided into two or more parts.
Also, as Driesch repeatedly notes, the cells of the embryo include a prospective
potency or prospective power which enables them not only to develop parts which they
would have developed if the disturbing experiments would not have been conducted,
but also much more specialized parts of the growing organism.
This kind of reasoning clearly leads to the conclusion that a (without doubt highly
complex) hypothetical machine within the egg (‘Keim’) would have to be capable
of reproducing itself as well as producing every specialized machine necessary for a
complete development of the striven mature organism.
Many items in Gödel’s books on quantum mechanics leave no doubt that he must
have been very familiar with this kind of neovitalistic reasoning based on the impos-
sibility of the existence of a machine. And indeed, a short time before Turing and
Post had published their ideas on computability, Gödel had already written down
the first hints concerning his thoughts about his own (vitalistic) machine in 1935. In
Quantenmech. II we read the following note:
317. The machine that constructs a diagonal sequence of lawlike machines would be one
that produces more and more organization from unorganized matter, hence something
akin to a ‘germ’ (‘Keim’). 〈11〉
And in his Aflenz book, written about one year later, we can see the following refor-
mulation:
320. Problem: Definition of lawlike sequence as: sequence producible by a machine
[Machine that produces a sequence of machines, and this diagonal sequence would be
something that transforms more and more unorganized matter into organized matter
(germ).] 〈12〉
The association to organized and unorganized matter as well as the clear allusion to
the ‘Keim’ leave no doubt as to where the idea of a computing machine originates
from. At the same time it should be noted that the concept of ‘Diagonalfolge’ is of
course the actual essence both of Gödel’s incompleteness proof and of Turing’s main
results concerning the halting problem.
It is now possible to deduce certain formal properties of what we are going to call
the Gödel machine.
• The machine has an output device to which it can write (possibly infinite) se-
quences of data.
• The type of the elements of the output sequences includes the set of machines
or at least of some suitable encodings of these machines.
• As the output of a machine again can be machines, we can identify the terms
machine and machine description.
• The fact that Gödel speaks of a ‘Diagonalfolge’ seems to imply that any proposed
set of possible machines is enumerable and can be diagonalized.
It remains an open question if the machines Gödel had in mind were also supposed to
be equipped with an input device. In what follows, the machines are simply assumed
to start their operations ‘on the empty tape’. Note that the term Gödel machine will




The ‘problem’ Gödel encounters in item 320 of his Aflenz notebook is based on an
ambiguity of the term lawlike sequence [gesetzmäßige Folge]. In this section, two con-
flicting definitions of this term are given, and each definition is applied to the diagonal
sequence [Diagonalfolge] mentioned by Gödel. To this end, we fix an enumeration
m0,m1, . . . of all possible Gödel machines and denote the (infinite) output sequence
of machine mi by (s
j
i )j∈N. If a machine mi has only finitely many outputs (either be-
cause it halts or gets stuck in an infinite loop without any further outputs) and the last
output is ski , we let s
l
i = 0 for each l > k. Without loss of generality we assume s
j
i ∈ N
for i, j ∈ N. The sequence (sii)i∈N is then called a diagonal sequence [Diagonalfolge].
One can now formalize the ‘problematic’ definition taken from item 320 as follows.
Definition 1: An infinite sequence of natural numbers (tj)j∈N is lawlike [gesetzmäßig ]
iff there exists an i ∈ N with tj = sji for all j ∈ N. In other words, there has to be a
Gödel machine with the output sequence (tj)j∈N.
It is now immediately clear that, following this definition, the diagonal sequence
is not lawlike, because—due to the usual conflict on the diagonal—there can be no
machine on the list producing the closely related sequence (sii+1)i∈N.
17 Intuitively, this
result feels ‘problematic’, because the diagonal sequence follows a very simple building
law. It should be very interesting to note how closely Gödel’s ideas resemble those of
Turing, if only the term lawlike sequence be changed to computable sequence.18
At this point it seems to be useful to introduce the notion of randomness as a
natural counterpart to lawlikeness.19 The second definition will therefore define ran-
domness of infinite sequences of natural numbers, taking up ideas from the field of
Algorithmic Information Theory (see Chaitin 1987; Calude 2002 ). For this purpose,
we will first adopt and customise the definition of a (universal) computer. This in turn
will lead to the notion of program size complexity which will enable us to capture
the meaning of randomness in connection with infinite sequences of natural numbers.
In the definitions, A is a finite alphabet. A∗ denotes the set of finite words over the
alphabet A.
Definition 2.1: A Chaitin computer is a partial computable function C : A∗ → A∗
such that the domain of C is prefix-free.
Note that the computers defined here take only programs as their input, i.e. the
programs themselves do not operate on any data.20 The prefix-free domain ensures
that programs are self-delimiting : a computer knows where its programs end.21
Definition 2.2: A Chaitin computer C is universal if for each Chaitin computer D
there is a constant c with the following property: if C(x) is defined, then there exists
17Here it is assumed that the lawlikeness of the sequence (sii)i∈N implies the lawlikeness of the sequence
(sii + 1)i∈N.
18In Turing 1936–7, Turing stresses the interchangeability between the terms computable number and com-
putable sequence.
19Although there seems to be no direct influence, it is interesting to note that Driesch explicitely identifies the
terms ‘random’ (‘zufällig’) and ‘lawless’ (‘gesetzlos’) in Driesch 1928, p. 374.
20Usually, the domain of a computer is defined as A∗ × A∗, which is interpreted as the set of program/data
pairs. While the data plays a crucial role in the definition of conditional complexity, it is set to the empty word
if (as in the present situation) only unconditional complexities are considered. See Chaitin 1987, Calude 2002
for further details.
21The computers operating on self-delimiting programs are named after Gregory Chaitin who first considered
this property.
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a string x′ such that D(x′) = C(x) and |x′| ≤ |x|+ c, where |x| denotes the length of
the string x.
A universal Chaitin computer is thus able to imitate any other Chaitin computer D
by simply prefixing to the programs of D an explanation (of length c) how D works.
We can now fix a universal Chaitin computer U and define the program-size complexity
H of an output string x as the length of the shortest program for U computing x.
Definition 2.3: The program-size complexity is the partial function H : A∗ → N with
H(x) = min {|p| : p ∈ A∗, U(p) = x}.
Whereas the program-size complexity does indeed depend on the fixed universal
computer U , it can be shown that the corresponding complexities differ only at most
by a constant value c (see Calude 2002 ). Finally, we can now define randomness of
infinite strings. The basic idea is to consider the set of finite prefixes of this infinite
string, stipulating the algorithmical incompressibility of these prefixes. If Aω denotes
the set of infinite sequences over the alphabet A and x ∈ Aω, x(n) denotes the finite
prefix of x of length n.
Definition 2.4: A sequence x ∈ Aω is random iff there exists a natural c such that
H(x(n)) ≥ n− c for all natural n ≥ 1. A sequence x ∈ Aω is lawlike [gesetzmäßig ] iff
it is not random.
In other words, an infinite sequence is lawlike iff infinitely many of it prefixes can
be algorithmically compressed, which is now indeed possible with Gödel’s diagonal
sequence. To demonstrate this, we consider a prefix of the diagonal of length n. A
program computing this prefix may now proceed as follows: if the number n and the
number k of the first n Gödel machines that reach the diagonal are hardwired into the
program, it constructs and simulates these n machines until k of them have reached
the diagonal. The remaining diagonal elements are then set to zero. Note that such a
program would consist of 2 log2 n + c bits and therefore, for large enough n, is indeed
much shorter than the prefix itself.
6. An Implementation of Gödel’s Keim-machine
Gödel’s machine as introduced in his notebooks on quantum mechanics is remarkable
for the fact that it obviously seems to enumerate all possible machine descriptions and
at the same time simulates their actual behaviour, at least up to the diagonal element.
Machines of this type have indeed been considered in the literature in more recent
times, notably by Gregory Chaitin who introduces a machine calculating the halting
probability Ω by enumerating and running all possible machine descriptions (Chaitin
1998 ). Chaitin uses a Scheme-like dialect of the Lisp programming language, fixing
a very limited number of primitive functions mainly for list manipulation and arith-
metic operations. The main new ingredient which makes his dialect very suitable for
programming in an algorithmic information theory context, is the function try. It
takes three arguments: (1) a natural number limiting the number of execution steps
(realized by a limited depth of the recursive descend of the executing interpreter),
(2) a Lisp expression which is tried to be evaluated, and (3) a list of binary data
used as an environment accessible by the evaluated expression through the built-in
functions read-bit and read-exp, the latter reading a complete Lisp expression.
try always returns a list of three values: an indicator if the evaluation was successful
(success/failure), the value of the expression or the reason for not being success-
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ful (out-of-time/out-of-data), and a (chronological) list of caught outputs of the
evaluated expression, thrown by the function display.22
It is exactly the function try that enables us to actually implement and run Gödel’s
Keim machine, given in Figure 2, in an amazingly compact way. Gödel machines are
taken to be binary strings representing a piece of software consisting of a Lisp prefix
possibly followed by further binary data used by the prefix itself. The Keim machine
maintains a list of these binary programs. In each step of an infinite loop, the longest
programs are extended by the bits 1 and 0. (To this end, the prog-list contains a list of
the longest programs as its car, whereas the complete list of programs can be found as
its cdr.) After having extended the prog-list, each program is executed up to a certain
time limit which increases while the prog-list is processed.
When a single binary program (with number n) is executed within a certain time
limit, several cases may occur.
(1) The program has already produced at least n outputs. In this case the diagonal
element can be displayed as an output of the Keim machine.
(2) Otherwise we consider two subcases:
(a) The execution of the program has been stopped running out of time. In
this case no output is displayed. (The program will be executed again with
a larger time limit in the next round.)
(b) If the program has terminated regularly or because it ran out of data, a 0
is displayed as its diagonal element.
Note that no program is ever deleted from the prog-list and that therefore the same
outputs are produced again and again. In order to identify these outputs, they are
combined with the number of the producing program. This phenomenon might raise
the issue of efficiency of the Keim machine. However, as there are infinitely many
busy-beaver -like programs on the list whose number of steps grows faster than any
computable function, it is not worth following this issue.
As the Keim machine presented here is itself a Gödel machine, it will eventually
produce and execute itself. Consisting of 10784 bits23 in its binary version, it will
eventually be found in the prog-list among the first 210785 − 1 programs.
7. Conclusion
The discovery of Gödel’s notes about a computing machine certainly does not lead to
the necessity of rewriting the history of the invention of the Turing machine. How-
ever, it does offer yet another jigsaw piece of Gödel’s rich contribution to the modern
information based society.
It is interesting to note that, while Francis Crick has been reported in Chaitin
2012 as having been influenced by John von Neumann’s ideas about self-reproducing
automata, we now encouter an example of the opposite direction: Hans Driesch’s
biological experiments with the embryos of the sea urchin led him to his ‘philosophy
of the organism’ which in turn inspired Gödel to reflect about computing machines
and the problems arising ‘on the diagonal.’
22For an introduction to Chaitin’s Lisp dialect see Chaitin 1998 or Chaitin 2001. Chaitin 1998 also provides
an interpreter written in the Mathematica language.
23In order to count the bits, ‘syntactic sugar’ has to be removed from the program and for instance all let-






[Extends a single program by 1 and by 0.]
cons append ’(1) prog
cons append ’(0) prog
nil
let (extend-progs progs)
[Extends a list of programs, using extend-prog.]
if = length progs 0
nil
append (extend-prog car progs)
(extend-progs cdr progs)
let (extend-prog-list prog-list)
[Extends a prog-list whose car are the longest programs
and whose cdr are all programs.]





let (run-progs progs n limit)
[Executes progs within a limited number of steps.]
if > length progs 0





let (nth pos list)
[Return the n-th element of the list.]
if = pos 0
car list
(nth (- pos 1) cdr list)
let (run prog n limit)
[Executes the n-th prog within a limited number of steps.
If possible, displays the program along with its diagonal element.]
let result try limit ’(eval read-exp) prog
let outputs caddr result
if < n length outputs
display cons n cons (nth n outputs) nil
if = out-of-time cadr result
nil
display cons n cons 0 nil
let progs cdr prog-list
let temp (run-progs progs
- length progs 1
0)
(keim (extend-prog-list prog-list))
Figure 2.: Gödel’s Keim machine implemented in Lisp. The machine executes a list
of binary programs, increasing the time limit while the programs are getting shorter.
The list is then extended by a set of programs of increased length. This process is
repeated infinitely and started by the expression (keim ’((()) ())), the argument
representing the list containing only one (empty) program.
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Gödel himself often stressed the fruitfulness of the identification of analogies.24 And
although his extensive notes on quantum mechanics reveal that vitalism was part of
his Weltbild, it should be stressed that, when drawing upon such analogies, there is
certainly no need to actually accept their underlying ideas and concepts: Even the
strongest opposition to a darwinistic theory of evolution can not deny the success
of the so-called evolutionary algorithms which rely heavily on Darwin’s ideas. The
inspiring impact of Driesch’s experiments on Gödel’s thinking should be regarded in
exactly the same way.
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Gödel, K. 1961. ‘The modern development of the foundations of mathematics in the
light of philosophy.’ Printed in Gödel 1995, 374–387.
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Appendix A. Original German versions
1. Die Monade eines tierischen Körpers ist eine Existenz, andererseits irgendwie identisch
mit Organisation [Ordnung der Teile]. Dies wird verständlich durch die Photochemie.
Dadurch wandelt sich eine offenbare Substanz (Lichtquant) um in eine Organisation
(komplexe Struktur). Aus dem Prinzip der Erhaltung der Individuen folgt daher, dass
diese komplexe Struktur eine gewisse einfache Subst. ist.
2. Bem. (Phil.): Die mat. (posit.) Weltanschauung bedeutet auf die Wirklichkeit bezogen,
dass es nur Gesetze von Druck und Stoß [und sonst nur das Chaos] gibt und nur ma-
terielle Dinge. Eine andere Form, dass es nur Empfindungen und Gesetze ihrer Aufeinan-
derfolge gibt. Eine Überschreitung 〈ist〉 in zweifacher Richtung möglich:
1.) Was die existierenden Dinge betrifft: Seele, Begriffe, Engel.
2.) Was die bestehenden Gesetzmäßigkeiten (d.h. allgemeinen Sachverhalte) betrifft:
Gerechtigkeit, Aberglaube, etc.
Posit. ist insofern besser, als wenigstens keine Einschränkung der Gesetze, aber in
Wahrheit 〈sind〉 überhaupt keine Gesetze formulierbar. [...] Der Posit. ist die einzige
Form des Mat., die in der Gegenwart noch bestehen kann.
3. Es gibt scheinbar übergeordnete Organisationsformen.
1. unorganisierter Äther vielleicht = Licht





Obwohl jedes Ding der Stufe n Dinge der Stufe n − 1 als Teil enthält, so ist es nicht
als räumliches Aggregat dieser zu verstehen. D.h., sein Verhalten kann nicht durch
raumzeitliche Gesetze bezüglich der Dinge des (n − 1)-Typs erklärt werden. D.h., der
[für die Voraussage des Verhaltens nötige] Zustand (Verhältnis zueinander) der Elemen-
tarteile ist kein räumliches Verhältnis. Z.B. zwei Wasserstoff 〈Atome〉 können stehen
in dem Verhältnis des ‘ein Wasserstoffmolekül bilden’ oder in dem Verhältnis des ‘zwei
getrennte Wasserstoffatome bilden’ und verhalten sich dann verschieden, obwohl die
Wahrscheinlichkeiten der raumzeitlichen Lage vielleicht ähnlich sind. Ebenso kann ein
Atomsystem vielleicht in dem Verhältnis des ‘einen Organismus bilden’ stehen oder in
dem Verhältnis ‘einen Atomhaufen bilden’ und dementsprechend sich anders verhalten.
D.h., ein Organismus wird nicht dadurch beschrieben, dass man die raumzeitliche Lage
der ihn bildenden Atome angibt, sondern man muss außerdem etwas hinzufügen von der
Art ‘und sie bilden einen Organismus’. Oder es ist noch eine Entel. dabei. [Diese wäre der
Unterschied zwischen Organismus und Maschine, würde aber nicht die Möglichkeit einer
künstlichen Herstellung von Leben ausschließen.] Daraus würde folgen etwa: Organisa-
tion kann nicht erklärt werden durch feldmäßige, in der lebenden Subst. fortgepflanzte
Wirkungen [denn diese müssten ja bei Materie im unorganisierten Zustand dieselben
sein].
4. Der Organismus ist ein spezifischer individueller Körper, aufgebaut von einer typischen
Kombination verschiedener spezifischer Teile, welche jeweils eine bestimmte physiologis-
che Funktion ausüben. [...] aber der Organismus ist nicht ein Aggregat, nicht einmal für
die oberflächlichste Betrachtung.
5. Der erwachsene Organismus ist nun offenbar ein mehrstufiges Gebilde: es besteht aus
Organen als Teilganzen, diese aus Geweben, diese aus Zellen, diese aus Intrazellularsub-
stanzen, diese aus Molekülen, diese aus Elektronen. Von der Entwicklung des Organis-
mus aber können wir nunmehr sagen, dass sie auf ihrem Weg vom Ei zum Erwachsenen
das Lebewesen aus einer wenigstufigen in eine hochstufige Mannigfaltigkeit überführe,
wenigstens soweit Sichtbares in Frage kommt.
6. Die Quantenmechanik begünstigt die mystischen Lösungen der Fragen Vitalismus,
Hellsehen, Gestalttheorie, Verhältnis von Gehirn und Bewußtsein, weil die anderen
Lösungen lediglich aus der Annahme einer Raumzeit-Physik als Rahmen folgen.
Die Frage ‘Wie verläuft der Vorgang im Einzelnen raumzeitlich’, die das frucht-
barste Mittel der Analyse einer Erscheinung ist, hat sich beim Prozess der Ausstrahlung
zum ersten Mal als unfruchtbar und sinnlos erwiesen. Vielleicht ist es bei den oben
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unter Anführungszeichen stehenden unerklärlichen Erscheinungen ebenso. (Sie sind nur
unerklärlich durch Stellung dieser Frage, d.h. Zugrundelegung der Raumzeit-Physik.)
7. Gewisse Geschehnisse an belebten Körpern sind von einer solchen Art, daß sie sich
nicht aus einer Kenntnis der Koordinaten (Lagen), Kräfte und Geschwindigkeiten der
einzelnen körperlichen Elemente herleiten lassen.
8. Ist der Unterschied des Lebendigen zum Leblosen vielleicht der, dass sich seine Wirkungs-
gesetze nicht in ‘mechanische’ Regeln fassen, d.h. nicht ‘formalisieren’ lassen? D.h. also
eine höhere Stufe der Komplikation. Die dem Vitalismus entgegengesetzte Anschauung
behauptet also einfach: Alles Lebendige ist tot.
9. Die Trennung ist die Disharm., die Vereinigung die Harmonie. Was wir letztenendes
wollen, ist also zur Einheit zurückkehren. [Aber vielleicht wollen die bösen Geschöpfe
gerade die Trennung?] D.h. also, ein ‘Ausgleich’ [equalization nach Goldstein]. Das-
selbe Prinzip 〈ist〉 auch in den physikalischen Gesetzen ausgedrückt, und daher 〈ist〉
die Gleichung V̈ = k∆V so häufig. Dieses physikalische Equalisationsprinzip 〈ist〉 aber
wahrscheinlich nicht das einzige, und insofern gibt es Entelech., welche nichts anderes
sind als höhere ‘Harmonizers’. Vielleicht sind schon für das Teilchenproblem und die
Quantenmechanik solche ‘höheren’ Harmonizers nötig [d.h. neben der in den Feldgle-
ichungen ausgedrückten equalization liegend].
10. Wir werden das Wort ‘Maschine’ in seinem allgemeinsten Sinne verstehen. Eine Ma-
schine ist uns also ein typische Anordnung physikalischer und chemischer Konstituenten,
durch deren Wirkung ein typischer Effekt erreicht wird.
11. 317. Die Maschine, welche eine Diagonalfolge einer Folge gesetzmäßiger26 gesetzmäßiger
Maschinen konstruiert, wäre eine solche, welche immer mehr Organisation aus unorgan-
isierter Materie hervorbringt, also etwas ähnliches wie ein ‘Keim’.
12. 320. Problem: Definition von gesetzmäßiger Folge als: durch Maschine herstellbare Folge
[Maschine, welche eine Folge von Maschinen herstellt, und diese Diagonalfolge wäre
etwas, was immer mehr unorganisierte Materie in organisierte verwandelt (Keim).]
26Actually, the word ‘einer’ is not cancelled here. This would allow for the following reading: ‘Die Maschine,
welche eine Diagonalfolge einer gesetzmäßigen Maschine konstruiert, wäre eine solche, [...]’ It is assumed that
Gödel simply forgot to cross the word out.
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